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RIGHT OF COMPANIONSHIP IN ADULT CHILDREN  
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that due 
process1 under the Fourteenth Amendment consists of both 
procedural and substantive components.2  The procedural aspect 
ensures that adequate procedure is provided when the government 
or government actors take life, liberty, or property from an 
individual.3  The substantive component ensures that fundamental 
 
 ∗ J.D. candidate May 2005, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2000, 
University of Pennsylvania, magna cum laude. 
 1 The Constitution contains Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendments.  U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.  The Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause applies to the federal government and reads, “No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. V.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to state and 
local governments and provides, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause is the means by which Congress has incorporated 
most of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states.  Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). 
 2 “Although a literal reading of the [Due Process] Clause might suggest that it 
governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at 
least 105 years . . . [it] has been understood to contain a substantive component as 
well, one ‘barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.’”  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).  The Mathews court laid out the 
test to determine whether due process has been provided. 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
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rights are protected from governmental intrusion;4 hence, it is said to 
add “substance” to the normally procedural Due Process Clause.5 
Under the substantive component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized 
many familial rights.  These include the right to companionship, 
care, custody, and management of minor children;6 the right to keep 
the family together;7 the right to child-rearing;8 and the right to marry 
and procreate.9  Recently, several circuit courts have addressed the 
issue of whether parents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest in the continued association of their adult children.10  While 
the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that parents do have 
a constitutionally protected right of companionship in their adult 
children, 11 the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits have held that they do 
not.12  The issue might have been resolved by the Supreme Court in 
two cases in which certiorari was granted, but in both cases certiorari 
was dismissed as improvidently granted.13 
 
Id. at 335. 
 4 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. at 847 (quoting Justice Brandeis 
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) saying, “it is settled that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as 
well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the 
term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.”) 
 5 James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 95 (1996).  For a thorough discussion of the concept of 
substantive due process as based on traditional American political theory, see id. at 
95-104.  See also James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the 
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320-45 (1999). 
 6 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 7 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 8 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 10 Such a right would allow recovery to a parent upon the wrongful death of a 
child who was above the statutory age of minority.  See, e.g., McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 
F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 
F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 11 Bell, 746 F.2d at 1243; Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86; Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748, 748 
n.1; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189. 
 12 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 822; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656. 
 13 Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 430 
(1982); Jones v. Hildebrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 183 
(1977).  In Espinoza, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed certiorari for lack of 
finality.  Espinoza, 456 U.S. at 430.  In Jones, the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari 
because Petitioner initially had claimed that her case was based on her personal 
liberty interest in raising her child without governmental interference, but 
afterwards, indicated that her claim was based on her unconstitutional deprivation of 
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This Comment articulates the view that a right of 
companionship in adult children should be recognized.  Part I of this 
Comment outlines general substantive due process analysis guidelines 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Part II examines various familial 
rights that the Supreme Court has recognized under the Due Process 
Clause.  Part III surveys cases that have dealt with the right of 
companionship between parents and adult children.  Part IV looks at 
recent social and economic trends that urge recognition of the right.  
Finally, this Comment concludes that recognition of a parental right 
of companionship in adult children is in line with general substantive 
due process analysis, and provides a framework for the scope of such 
a right. 
I. GENERAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
used the substantive component of the Due Process Clause to protect 
economic freedom of contract, which the Court saw as a fundamental 
right.14  The Court invalidated as many as two hundred state 
economic laws based on the implied fundamental right to freedom of 
contract found under the substantive Due Process Clause.15  By the 
mid-1930s, however, economic substantive due process came under 
attack as the Great Depression placed tremendous pressure on the 
government to play a more active role in the economy.16  Since 1937, 
the Supreme Court has shied away from using the Due Process Clause 
to invalidate state economic laws.17 
The Court, however, has not shown similar restraint in the non-
economic arena.  Under the substantive Due Process Clause, the 
Court has found that many non-economic rights are fundamental 
 
property.  Jones, 432 U.S. at 184-89. 
 14 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The Court held that a law enacted 
by the New York state legislature, which regulated the maximum number of hours 
that a baker could work, was violative of the individual’s right to freedom of contract 
under the substantive Due Process Clause.  Id. at 64.  The case marked the start of 
what is known as the “Lochner era,” in which the Court is said to have trammeled over 
state police powers.  See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).  The 
Court’s broad definition of liberty under Lochner, however, has never been officially 
rejected.  Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the 
Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 319 
(1991).  While the negative history of the substantive Due Process Clause “counsels 
caution and restraint, . . . it does not counsel abandonment.”  Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. 
 15 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 592 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 16 Id. at 597. 
 17 Id. at 601. 
  
1124 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1121 
including: the right to marry,18 the right to the companionship, care, 
and custody of one’s children,19 the right to keep the family 
together,20 the right to control the upbringing of one’s children,21 the 
right to get an abortion,22 the right to refuse medical treatment,23 and 
numerous other rights.24 
The process by which the Court implies fundamental rights via 
the substantive Due Process Clause is far from an exact science.  
Justice Harlan described this unempirical analysis in his famous 
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman:25 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code.  The best that 
can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it 
has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon 
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck 
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.26 
Because the Supreme Court has recognized that substantive due 
process analysis often has little backing in the text of the 
Constitution, the Court follows a conservative path when deciding 
which rights are and are not fundamental.27  As an initial principle, 
the Court has warned that there should be “great resistance” to 
expanding the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause.28 
Despite its pervasive indefiniteness, substantive due process 
analysis consistently follows some general guidelines.  The Court’s 
 
 18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 19 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 20 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 21 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 23 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 24 This rather broad recognition of rights has had its critics.  Substantive due 
process has often been chided as the judiciary’s means by which to interject its 
personal beliefs into constitutional law-making.  John Hart Ely stated, “[W]e 
apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction 
in terms – sort of like ‘green pastel redness’.”  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).  Also, Robert H. Bork called 
substantive due process “a momentous sham.”  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990).  Despite this criticism, 
however, substantive due process in the non-economic sphere has remained strong 
in the late twentieth century.  Ely, supra note 5, at 315-16. 
 25 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 26 Id. 
 27 “The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution.”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 
(1986). 
 28 Id. at 195. 
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first query is to determine the right at stake and to assess whether the 
interest is a fundamental right that falls within the ambit of “life, 
liberty, 29 or property” comprising the Due Process Clause.30  In 
ascertaining whether a fundamental right is at stake, the Court uses 
broad guideposts such as: whether the right is “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if [it] were sacrificed,”31 if it is “deeply rooted in the Nation’s 
history and tradition,”32 or, if it is “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”33  Hence, 
there is a large emphasis on American tradition and culture to 
determine whether a right is fundamental. 
If the Court finds that the sought right represents American 
historic traditions and values, a fundamental right is implicated.34  On 
the other hand, if the Court finds that the sought right does not 
represent the Nation’s traditional values, there is no implied 
fundamental right cognizable in the Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive Due Process Clause.35  While this describes the general 
framework, the Court has recently departed somewhat from this 
standard.  For instance, in Lawrence v. Texas,36 the Court found that 
consenting adults had the right to engage in private homosexual 
activity under the substantive Due Process Clause,37 even though the 
argument that there were historical traditions underlying this type of 
activity was tenuous.38 
 
 29 In general, the Court has defined the “liberty” protected under the substantive 
Due Process Clause very broadly.  The Court has stated: 
Without doubt, [“liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men. 
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 30 Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 
625, 630-31 (1992). 
 31 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 
(1937)). 
 32 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. 
 33 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934)). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 765. 
 36 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 37 Id. at 578. 
 38 See id. at 570-72.  The Court explained that historically, there were laws 
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Based on whether or not the Court finds a fundamental right, 
different levels of means-end scrutiny ensue.39  On one end, when the 
Court finds that no fundamental right exists, a challenged 
government action need only survive “rational basis” review.40  This 
means that a government action allegedly depriving an individual of 
a right must be a “rational” means for furthering a “legitimate” 
government interest.41  Under this standard, the Court defers to the 
government upon a finding of any valid reason for the government 
action.42  At the other extreme, if a fundamental right is at stake, a 
government action must survive “strict scrutiny” review.43  This means 
 
banning homosexual acts, but argued that they generally were not enforced when 
dealing with consenting adults acting in private.  Id.  On the other hand, the Court 
acknowledged that “for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral.”  Id. at 571.  Given this incongruent historical 
background, the Court concluded, “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point, but 
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”  Id. at 572 
(quoting Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 39 For the genesis of means-end scrutiny, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  In general, the judiciary defers to the legislature unless 
it finds that the government action infringes a fundamental right.  See Hilliard, supra 
note 5, at 105-06.  Means-end scrutiny is also used for analysis under the Equal 
Protection Clause, in which the judiciary defers to the legislature unless it finds that 
the government action discriminates against a “discrete and insular” minority.  See id.  
The “discrete and insular” terminology comes from Carolene Products.  304 U.S. at 
152, n.4.  Means-end scrutiny under the Due Process Clause has only two tiers of 
review, rational basis and strict scrutiny.  See Hilliard, supra note 5, at 105.  The 
analysis for the Equal Protection Clause has three tiers, rational basis, strict scrutiny, 
and an intermediate level of review.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 645-47.  For an 
argument urging the Court to adopt intermediate level scrutiny for the Due Process 
Clause as well, see Leading Cases, Substantive Due Process – Intermediate Level Scrutiny, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 210 (1992). 
 40 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 764. 
 41 Id. at 651.  Although this is the gist of the test, rational basis review has been 
phrased in numerous ways by the Supreme Court.  In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court said: 
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of 
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. . . . 
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden 
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is 
essentially arbitrary. 
Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.  In other instances, the Court has not articulated the test 
to be so deferential.  For example, in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 
(1920), the Court declared, “the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and 
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the  object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated 
alike.”  Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415. 
 42 Hilliard, supra note 5, at 106.  Although rational basis review is very deferential, 
it is not merely a formality.  Id.  Courts have invalidated legislation under the 
standard.  Id. 
 43 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 767. 
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that the government action must be “necessary”44 to further a 
“compelling” government interest.45 
II. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
INVOLVING THE FAMILY 
Under the substantive Due Process Clause, the Court has 
recognized various familial rights.  This section will survey each of 
these familial rights and discuss the context in which the Supreme 
Court recognized these rights as fundamental. 
A. The right to marry 
The Court first held that the right to marry was a fundamental 
right protected under the substantive Due Process Clause in Loving v. 
Virginia.46  The case arose out of a Virginia law that made it illegal for 
a white person to marry other than another white person.47  When a 
white male Virginia resident married a black female Virginia resident, 
both were sentenced to one year in prison.48  Although the bulk of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion dealt with the statute’s violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause,49 the Court posited that the statute also 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.50  
The Court noted, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”51 
 
 44 For an action to be “necessary,” the government must show that it could not 
further its interest with less of an infringement on the fundamental right.  Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 47 Id. at 2. 
 48 Id. at 3.  The trial judge suspended the sentence for twenty-five years as long as 
the couple agreed to leave the state of Virginia and not to return together for that 
period of time.  Id. 
 49 The Court rejected the State’s argument that the statute should pass 
constitutional muster because it applied equally to all races.  Id. at 8. 
There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation 
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. . . .  At 
the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial 
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to 
the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’ and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must 
be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible 
state objective . . . . 
Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
 50 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 51 Id.  The Court also articulated, “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . .  Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”  Id. 
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In Zablocki v. Redhail,52 the Court reaffirmed the premise of 
Loving that the right to marry is fundamental.53  Zablocki concerned a 
Wisconsin statute that prevented a person from marrying if he had a 
non-custodial minor child for whom he was required to pay child 
support.54  The Court stated, “it would make little sense to recognize a 
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not 
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the 
foundation of the family in our society.”55  Because the Court found 
that the right to marry was a fundamental right, it applied strict 
scrutiny review and held that none of the reasons for interfering with 
the right were necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest.56 
Although the Court reaffirmed the right to marry as 
fundamental in Zablocki, it did so under the Equal Protection 
Clause.57  The Court, however, also adopted Loving’s view that the 
right to marry was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.58  In addition, Justice Stewart wrote a concurring 
opinion arguing that the case should have been decided under due 
 
 52 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 386.  The Court also noted that “[l]ong ago, the Court characterized 
marriage as ‘the most important relation in life.’”  Id. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).  “It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been 
placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.”  Id. at 386. 
 56 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.  The reasons provided for the statute were: (1) it 
provided a mechanism by which people who had prior support obligations could be 
counseled before they entered into a marital relationship from which they derived 
even more support obligations; and (2) it protected the welfare of out-of-custody 
children.  Id.  For more Supreme Court cases that recognize the right to marry as 
fundamental, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a state law 
requiring prisoners to get permission from the superintendent before getting 
married was unconstitutional) and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) 
(holding that a state cannot require individuals to pay filing fees and court costs in 
order to receive a divorce). 
 57 Id. at 382-83. 
 58 Id. at 383-84.  As noted by the Zablocki court: 
The Court’s opinion [in Loving] could have rested solely on the 
ground that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  But the Court went on to hold that the 
laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry. The Court’s 
language on the latter point bears repeating: “The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Id. at 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
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process rather than equal protection:59 
The problem in this case is not one of discriminatory 
classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a 
constitutionally protected freedom.  I think that the Wisconsin 
statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds the bounds of 
permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere 
of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.60 
B. The right to keep the family together 
The Supreme Court recognized the right to keep the family 
together in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.61  The case concerned an 
Ohio housing ordinance that restricted the categories of family 
members that could live together in one household.62  Under the 
ordinance, a grandmother was prohibited from living with her 
grandson.63  The Court applied strict scrutiny review and held that 
the ordinance was not necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest.64 
In holding the ordinance to be violative of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted, “[t]his Court 
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”65  The Court 
continued, “[a] host of cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a 
‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’”66  
Additionally, the Court commented on the unsuitability of bright line 
rules in substantive due process analysis, and the traditional value 
that American society has placed on the institution of the family.67  
 
 59 Id. at 391-403. 
 60 Id. at 391-92. 
 61 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 62 Id. at 495-96. 
 63 Id. at 499.  The particular household consisted of a grandmother, her son, and 
her two grandsons who were first cousins to each other.  Id. at 496.  John Moore, Jr., 
the grandson with whom it was a violation for the grandmother to live, came to live 
with his grandmother when his mother died.  Id. at 496-97. 
 64 Id. at 499-500.  The city claimed that the governmental interests were (1) 
“preventing overcrowding,” (2) “minimizing traffic and parking congestion,” and (3) 
“avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.”  Moore, 431 
U.S. at 499-500.  While the Court recognized that these were legitimate goals, it held 
that the ordinance “serve[d] them marginally at best.”  Id. at 500. 
 65 Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 
(1974)). 
 66 Id. (citations omitted). 
 67 Id. at 503-04. 
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The Court emphasized that American tradition valued not only the 
nuclear family, but also the extended, non-traditional family unit.68  
Thus, the Due Process Clause protects constitutional rights not only 
for parents and children, but also for the extended family unit.69 
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,70 
which dealt with the rights of foster parents, the Court moved beyond 
biological relationships and recognized that a parent-child bond 
could be created even without a blood relationship.71 
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the 
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional 
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, 
and from the role it plays in ‘promot(ing) a way of life’ through 
the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood 
relationship.  No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving 
and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in 
his or her care may exist even in the absence of a blood 
relationship.72 
Despite this strong language, the Court did not affirmatively hold 
that the relationship was protected by the Due Process Clause 
because it opted to decide the case on narrower grounds.73  What is 
 
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines 
but rather from careful ‘respect for the teaching of history (and), solid recognition 
of the basic values that underlie our society.’  Our decisions establish that the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of 
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.  It is through the 
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral 
and cultural. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 68 Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05. 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds 
uniting the members of the nuclear family.  The tradition of uncles, 
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along 
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally 
deserving of constitutional recognition.  Over the years, millions of our 
citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely, 
have profited from it.  Even if conditions of modern society have 
brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not 
erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the 
centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger 
conception of the family.  Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family 
responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together 
and participate in the duties and satisfactions of a common home. 
Id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 71 Id. at 844. 
 72 Id. (citations omitted). 
 73 Id. at 847.  Additionally, the Court also noted differences between foster 
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clear, however, is that in both Moore and Smith, the Court chose not to 
draw arbitrary lines deciding who was entitled to a fundamental right 
under the substantive Due Process Clause. 
C. The right to control upbringing of children 
One of the first cases that dealt with familial substantive due 
process rights, Meyer v. Nebraska, 74 recognized the right of a parent to 
control the upbringing of his or her children.  The case concerned a 
state law that proscribed teaching a subject in any language besides 
English, and prohibited teaching a child any language other than 
English before he or she passed eighth grade.75  The Court 
acknowledged that the statute’s purpose, to make English the mother 
tongue of all American students, was legitimate,76 but held that the 
law improperly interfered with the parent’s right to direct the 
upbringing of his or her children.77  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society 
of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 78 the Court again 
recognized the right of parents to control and direct the upbringing 
of their children.79 
Even when the governmental interest has been extremely 
compelling, the Court has not allowed curtailment of a parent’s right 
to control the upbringing of his or her children.  For example, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,80 the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had a 
 
parents and biological parents.  Id. at 845.  For example, the Court explained that a 
biological parent-child relationship existed entirely apart from the State, but a foster 
parent-child relationship had state law as its source.  Id. 
 74 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 75 Id. at 397. 
 76 Id. at 398. 
 77 Id. at 400. 
 78 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 79 Id. at 534-35. The case dealt with a state law that required children to attend 
public schools.  Id. at 530.  The Court held that: 
[T]he Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control . . . .  The child is not the mere creature of the 
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations. 
Id. at 534-35.  Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a child 
labor law as applied to a minor girl engaging in religious solicitation did not violate 
the parents’ substantive due process right in directing the upbringing of their child).  
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . .  But the family itself is not 
beyond regulation in the public interest . . . .”  Id. at 166. 
 80 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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right to decide not to send their children to school beyond eighth 
grade despite a compulsory school attendance law.81  The Court 
noted, “a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we 
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges 
on fundamental rights and interests, such as . . . the traditional 
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their 
children.”82 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, recently upheld the 
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children even in 
the face of objection by grandparents.  In Troxel v. Granville,83 the 
Court permitted a mother (“Granville”) to limit her two daughters’ 
visitation with their grandparents (“the Troxels”).84  In that case, a 
Washington state law gave “any person” the right to petition for 
visitation of a child, and authorized a court to grant visitation 
whenever it found that granting visitation was within “the best 
interest of the child.”85  After the father of the children committed 
suicide, Granville decided to decrease the number of visits between 
the Troxels and her daughters.86  In response, the Troxels filed a 
petition seeking increased visitation with the children.87  Granville 
appealed when the state court allowed increased visitation.88 
The Supreme Court, in reversing the state court’s holding, first 
noted that the right of parents to determine the upbringing of their 
children was one of the oldest rights found under the substantive 
Due Process Clause.89  The Court then faulted the state court for not 
 
 81 Id. at 234.  The Amish believed that sending their children to school beyond 
eighth grade would interfere with the inculcation of Amish values and way of life.  Id. 
at 210-11. 
 82 Id. at 214 (citations omitted). 
 83 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 84 Id. at 72-75.  The Troxels were the grandparents on the father’s side.  Id. at 60. 
 85 Id. at 60. 
 86 Id. at 60-61. 
 87 Id. at 61. 
 88 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.  The court did not grant either party’s requested 
visitation exactly, but granted compromised visitation somewhere in between what 
each party had originally requested.  Id. 
 89 “The liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”  Id. at 65.  Justice Scalia agreed that the 
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children was important, but 
objected to the Court’s decision to grant it Constitutional protection: 
In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children is among the “unalienable Rights” with which the Declaration 
of Independence proclaims “all men . . . are endowed by their 
Creator.” And in my view that right is also among the “othe[r] [rights] 
retained by the people” which the Ninth Amendment says the 
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giving Granville’s determination of her children’s best interest the 
deference that it deserved.90  Thus, the Court held that a parent’s 
right to control the upbringing of her children was expansive enough 
to override any right that grandparents may have to seek increased 
visitation.91 
D. The right to companionship, care, custody, and management of 
one’s children 
The Court recognized the right to the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of one’s children in Stanley v. Illinois.92  
The case arose out of a situation where a couple, Joan and Peter 
Stanley, had lived together intermittently for eighteen years, having 
three children together.93  After Joan died, the children were placed 
with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an Illinois law that 
required children of unwed fathers to become wards of the State 
upon the mother’s death.94 Peter Stanley sued arguing that he had 
been denied the equal protection of the laws.95 
Stanley claimed that since married fathers and unwed mothers 
could not be deprived of their children without a showing of parental 
unfitness, he, as an unwed father, had been denied the equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.96  Although 
the case dealt mainly with equal protection and procedural due 
process, the Court relied in part on previous substantive Due Process 
cases respecting the family in finding that Peter Stanley had been 
 
Constitution’s enumeration of rights “shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage.” The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal 
prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution’s 
refusal to “deny or disparage” other rights is far removed from 
affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing 
judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list 
against laws duly enacted by the people. Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Furthermore, it seems that Justice Thomas would agree with Justice Scalia.  See id. at 
80.  (Thomas, J., concurring).  “I write separately to note that neither party has 
argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the 
original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of 
unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision.”  Id.  (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Given that neither party had brought up the issue, Justice Thomas 
opined that a parent’s fundamental right to control the upbringing of her children 
resolved the case.  Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 90 Id. at 69. 
 91 See id. at 72-73. 
 92 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 93 Id. at 646. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
  
1134 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1121 
denied both constitutional rights.97 
In finding that the Illinois law violated equal protection and 
procedural due process, the Court noted the extreme importance 
that the Court has historically allotted to the family: 
[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children 
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and 
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.  It is plain 
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, 
and management of his or her children ‘come(s) to this Court 
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to 
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic 
arrangements.’98 
Furthermore, the Court made clear that historically it had refused to 
draw bright line rules based on the presence or absence of a marriage 
ceremony.99  As an example, the Court stated that in Levy v. 
Louisiana,100 it had declared unconstitutional a state statute that 
denied illegitimate children the right to bring a wrongful death 
action following the death of their natural mother.101  In that case, the 
Court had been influenced by the fact that familial bonds could be 
just as warm and enduring as those within a more formal family 
unit.102  Thus, the Court held that the mere fact that Peter Stanley had 
never married Joan could not be used to deny him the fundamental 
right to companionship, care, custody, and management of his 
children.103 
In Lehr v. Robertson,104 however, the Court held that the state 
could terminate an unmarried father’s parental rights without 
providing procedural due process.105  It distinguished Stanley by 
noting that in that case, the father had a close relationship with his 
children, but in Lehr, the father did not.  The Court opined: 
[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in 
personal contact with his child acquires substantial 
protection under the due process clause. At that point it 
 
 97 Id. at 651 (citing, inter alia, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 98 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 99 Id. at 651-52. 
 100 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
 101 Id. (citing Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72). 
 102 Id. at 652 (citing Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72). 
 103 Id. at 658. 
 104 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 105 Id. at 265. 
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may be said that he ‘act[s] as a father toward his children.’  
But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit 
equivalent constitutional protection.  The actions of judges 
neither create nor sever genetic bonds.106 
Thus, the Court looked to the actual relationship that a parent 
shared with his child to determine whether that parent had a 
constitutional claim for continued companionship with his child 
rather than arbitrarily assuming that every unwed father possessed 
such an interest.107 
In another decision, Santosky v. Kramer,108 the Court reiterated 
the importance of the right to companionship, care, custody, and 
management of a child.109  The Court emphasized that a biological 
parent’s right to companionship, care, and custody of her children is 
far more valuable than any property right.110  The decision primarily 
dealt with procedural due process and held that a state must support 
its allegations of parental neglect with clear and convincing evidence 
before it can sever a parent’s rights in her natural child.111  The 
decision, however, referred to the parental right of “care, custody, 
and management” of a child as a fundamental right under the Due 
Process Clause.112 
This survey of cases makes clear that the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized and preserved fundamental rights involving 
the family.  Furthermore, the Court has shunned the use of arbitrary 
lines and markers in determining whether a fundamental right exists.  
Especially when dealing with non-traditional family units such as 
those involving step-children and step-parents, the court has looked 
to the actual relationship shared by parent and child to determine 
whether there is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. 
III. CASES DISCUSSING THE PARENTAL RIGHT OF  
COMPANIONSHIP WITH ADULT CHILDREN 
The cases discussed in Part II of this Comment deal generally 
with Supreme Court recognition of familial rights under the 
substantive Due Process Clause.  While they illustrate  the Court’s 
 
 106 Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 389 n.7 (1979)). 
 107 Id.  But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (holding that 
even an unmarried father who had a close relationship with his child was not entitled 
to due process when the child’s mother was married to another man). 
 108 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
 111 See id. at 769. 
 112 Id. at 1394-95. 
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expansive protection of the family, they all involve minor children in 
their parents’ custody and thus point only vaguely towards the 
recognition of a parental right of companionship with adult children 
who are no longer in their parents’ custody.  Lower courts, however, 
have directly addressed parents’ right of companionship with adult 
children and the Seventh,113 Tenth,114 and Ninth115 Circuits have ruled 
that it is constitutionally protected.  The First,116 Third,117 and D.C.118 
Circuits, however, have disagreed.  This section surveys these cases. 
A. Cases Extending Constitutional Protection to the Parental Right of 
Companionship in Adult Children 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
In Smith v. City of Fontana,119 the Ninth Circuit held that where it 
had previously recognized a parental right of companionship with 
minor children in Kelson v. City of Springfield,120 it was required as a 
matter of logic to find a child’s right of companionship with 
parents.121  Smith died as a result of excessive police violence during 
his arrest.122  Smith’s children alleged that the police officers had 
violated their substantive due process rights “not to be deprived of 
the life of their father and not to be deprived of his love, comfort, 
 
 113 Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a father 
had a constitutional right to companionship of an adult child, but that the adult 
child’s siblings had no comparable right in their relationship with him). 
 114 Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 746 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that a mother and sister had a constitutionally protected interest in their relationship 
with their son and brother). 
 115 Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
parents had a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship of their adult 
son apart from their right to parent); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that a mother had a right to the companionship of her mentally-
incompetent adult son). 
 116 Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that neither a stepfather 
nor siblings had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship of 
an adult son and brother). 
 117 McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a father did not 
have a constitutionally protected right of companionship with his adult son). 
 118 Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
mother did not have a constitutionally protected right of companionship with her 
adult son). 
 119 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. 
de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 120 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 121 Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418-20. 
 122 Id. at 1414. 
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and support.”123  Having already recognized a parental right of 
companionship with children, the court found that the interest 
logically extended to a child’s right in the companionship of his 
parents: 
We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial 
companionship and society logically extends to protect children 
from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with 
their parents.  The companionship and nurturing interest of 
parent and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are 
reciprocal, and we see no reason to accord less constitutional 
value to the child-parent relationship than we accord to the 
parent-child relationship.124 
The court acknowledged that allowing constitutional protection 
for a child-parent relationship implicated no custody concerns, 
unlike the parent-child relationship.125  The court, however, found 
this distinction insufficient to warrant differing constitutional 
protection.126  The court explained: 
When, as in this case, a child claims constitutional 
protection for her relationship with a parent, there is no custodial 
interest implicated, but only a companionship interest.  This 
distinction between the parent-child and the child-parent 
relationships does not, however, justify constitutional protection 
for one and not the other.  We hold that a child’s interest in her 
relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself to 
constitute a cognizable interest.127 
The Ninth Circuit took the next step and first officially 
recognized the right of companionship with adult children in 
Strandberg v. City of Helena.128  The claim arose out of a situation where 
police arrested the Strandbergs’ twenty-two year old son, Edward, for 
reckless driving.129  After arresting him, the police took Edward to the 
station and incarcerated him during the booking procedure.130  
Thirty minutes into the incarceration period, the police found 
Edward hanging from the cell ceiling, dead.131  Among other claims, 
 
 123 Id. at 1417. 
 124 Id. at 1418. 
 125 Id. at 1419. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Smith, 818 F.2d at 1419.  The court found support in its recognition of the non-
custodial companionship right in Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748, 748 
n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 128 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 129 Id. at 746. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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the Strandbergs filed suit for violation of their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.132 
The district court dismissed the Strandbergs’ claim that they had 
been deprived of their constitutional right to parent the decedent 
because Edward was past minority age.133  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
viewed the Strandbergs’ claim of companionship under the 
Fourteenth Amendment separate and apart from their right to 
custody and control of Edward, and found that the district court had 
not dismissed that claim.134  In doing so, the court recognized the 
right of companionship between parents and their adult child.135 
In Lee v. City of Los Angeles,136 the Ninth Circuit confirmed its 
recognition of the Fourteenth Amendment right of companionship 
between parents and their adult children.  The case arose out of the 
two-year long wrongful incarceration of Kerry Sanders, the mentally 
disabled son of Mary Sanders Lee.137  After police arrested Sanders, 
they mistakenly identified him as a fugitive named Robert Sanders.138  
The police department, however, failed to take appropriate steps to 
confirm his identity.139  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the police 
failed to take proper fingerprints and should have known that 
Sanders was not Robert Sanders because of his “obvious” mental 
incapacity and different identifying characteristics.140  The court 
found that the actions of the police department, if true, constituted a 
violation of Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to companionship of 
her son.141 
2. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of a parental right to 
 
 132 Id.  The plaintiffs also brought suit for violations of Edward’s rights under the 
First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as 
pendent state claims for assault and battery, negligence and gross negligence, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id. 
 133 Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748 n.1. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 250 F.3d 668, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 137 Id. at 676-77. 
 138 Id. at 677. 
 139 Id. at 678. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 685-86.  The opinion did not mention Kerry Sanders’ age; thus, one can 
fairly assume that he was an adult.  Furthermore, the court did not rely on any 
special considerations of Sanders’ mental condition in finding a violation of his 
mother’s constitutionally-protected companionship right.  Therefore, the argument 
that Lee is a special case dealing with the rights of parents in relation to their 
mentally incompetent children is invalid. 
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adult companionship in Bell v. City of Milwaukee.142  The case involved 
a police officer’s shooting and killing of a black man, Daniel Bell,143 
and a subsequent conspiracy, allegedly racially motivated, to conceal 
the facts underlying the shooting.144  Daniel Bell’s siblings and the 
estate of his father, Dolphus Bell, filed suit against the city of 
Milwaukee and numerous members of the Milwaukee police 
department for violation of their civil rights.145  Among other things, 
plaintiffs asserted that the police officers’ actions interfered with 
Dolphus Bell’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the 
continued association of his son and the siblings’ comparable 
associational right.146 
In finding a violation of Dolphus Bell’s constitutional rights, the 
Seventh Circuit noted that in its decisions, the Supreme Court had 
placed much importance on the parent-child relationship.147  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the defendants’ 
argument that Daniel Bell was no longer a minor and that Dolphus 
Bell thus did not have an associational right with his son.148  The court 
countered, however, “we are unpersuaded that a constitutional line 
 
 142 Bell, 746 F.2d 1205. 
 143 Id. at 1245.  Daniel Bell was twenty-three years old, and thus, no longer a minor 
at the time of the killing.  Id. at 1245. 
 144 Id. at 1214-22. 
 145 Id. at 1224. 
 146 Id.  The relevant statute under which plaintiffs based their claims is 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).  The statute only provides a remedy for the deprivation of 
constitutional and federal rights; it does not grant any substantive rights in and of 
itself.  Bell, 746 F.2d at 1232 n.29 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 
441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)). 
 147 Bell, 746 F.2d at 1243 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (holding 
that a state court that did not have personal jurisdiction over a mother could not cut 
off her right to custody of her children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) (holding that a child labor law as applied to a minor girl engaging in 
religious solicitation did not violate the parents’ substantive due process right in 
directing the upbringing of their child); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
(holding that forced sterilization of certain categories of convicted criminals violated 
a person’s right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding that a 
state law that proscribed teaching a subject in any other language but English 
violated the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children). 
 148 Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245. 
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based solely on the age of the child should be drawn.”149  The court 
reasoned that more than mere custody of a minor was 
constitutionally protected, and that the right extended to the 
parent’s “‘interest in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management’ of the child.”150  The court added that even in 
situations where a parent did not have legal custody of a child, the 
Supreme Court had protected the right to care and companionship 
of a child.151 
The Seventh Circuit panel also considered the particular familial 
situation of Daniel Bell.152  The court noted, “Daniel was single and 
had no children.  He had not become a part of another family unit; 
his father’s family was his immediate family.”153  The court also 
considered the “warm and close” relationship Daniel Bell shared with 
his father.154  Additionally, the court reasoned that as opposed to 
taking a child from a parent’s custody, the deprivation caused by the 
killing of a child, as in Daniel Bell’s situation, was far more 
remarkable.155  Thus, the court concluded that Daniel Bell’s majority 
age was not a bar to recovery, but rather, a fact that the jury 
appropriately could have taken into account when assessing the 
damages to be awarded to Dolphus Bell’s estate.156 
 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); see discussion supra 
Part II.D. 
 151 Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)) (holding that an 
adoption law that allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the 
adoption of her child violated equal protection principles). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245. 
 155 Id.  “[T]his deprivation was far more substantial than the unlawful removal of a 
child from the parent’s custody; it was the annihilation of the parent-child 
relationship.”  Id. 
 156 Id.  In coming to this conclusion, the court considered three factors: (1) other 
Seventh Circuit decisions that protected the parent-child relationship, see id. at 1244 
(citing Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that due process 
protects a parent’s relationship with his child); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 
1226-27 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that due process protects the interest in nurture 
and development of a child)); (2) the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 
1871 from which § 1983 is derived, see id., (“[T]he Act was meant to create a remedy 
where the parent-child relationship was interfered with by lawless, racially-motivated 
violence.”); and (3) other federal appellate court decisions recognizing due process 
violations for parental deprivations of custody and care of children in § 1983 actions, 
see id. at 1244-45 (citing Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that a plaintiff mother, whose son was transported to Germany by officials, had the 
right to establish at trial a deprivation of her relationship with her son without due 
process); Drollinger, 552 F.2d 1220 (holding that a grandfather’s claim that his 
daughter-in-law’s probation conditions deprived him of his constitutional right to 
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3. The Tenth Circuit  
In Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa 
Fe,157 the Tenth Circuit recognized a right of parental association with 
adult children.158  The case concerned the wrongful death of Richard 
Trujillo while he was an inmate at the Santa Fe County Jail.159  As a 
result, Richard’s mother, Rose Eileen Trujillo, and his sister, Patricia 
Trujillo, filed suit claiming that Richard’s wrongful death deprived 
them of their right of intimate familial association under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.160 
The Tenth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,161 which found that certain human relationships are 
protected against undue interference by the State.162  These 
relationships included “[f]amily relationships, [which] by their 
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily 
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly 
personal aspects of one’s life.”163  Thus, the court held that Rose 
Trujillo had a constitutionally protected right of association with her 
son.164 
 
 
care and development of his grandchild was actionable under § 1983); Duchesne v. 
Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that city bureau’s action of 
retaining custody of children without judicial approval was a deprivation remediable 
under § 1983)). 
 157 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 158 Id. at 1189.  The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Bell court’s refusal to allow 
siblings to claim the right of continued association, and it extended the right to 
Richard’s sister, Patricia Trujillo.  Id.  The court stated, “[a]lthough the parental 
relationship may warrant the greatest degree of protection and require the state to 
demonstrate a more compelling interest to justify an intrusion on that relationship, 
we cannot agree that other intimate relationships are unprotected and consequently 
excluded from the remedy established by section 1983.”  Id. 
 159 Id. at 1187. 
 160 Id. 
 161 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 162 Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188.  Roberts dealt with an organization whom the Court 
held was required to accept women as regular members.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.  
The Court held that such a requirement did not interfere with the Jaycees’ right to 
intimate association.  Id. at 621-22. 
 163 Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20). 
 164 Id. at 1189.  Although the court found that Rose Trujillo had a constitutionally 
protected right of association with her son, it maintained that to recover on the right, 
she had to prove an intentional interference under § 1983.  Id. at 1190.  Because the 
Trujillos’ complaint did not allege that the defendants acted with the intent to 
deprive them of their relationship with their son and brother, the court held that the 
Trujillos could not recover on the right.  See id. 
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B. Cases Declining to Recognize a Constitutional Parental Right of 
Companionship in Adult Children 
1. The First Circuit  
In direct opposition to the Ninth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, 
the First Circuit has held that there is no parental right of 
companionship with adult children.165  The First Circuit addressed 
the matter in Ortiz v. Burgos, when Jose Valdivieso Ortiz’s stepfather 
and siblings appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims for 
loss of companionship.166  The case arose when prison guards 
allegedly beat Ortiz to death while he was an inmate at a prison.167  
The court held that Supreme Court decisions establishing 
constitutional protections for various facets of family life fell short of 
establishing a liberty interest in the continued association of an adult 
child. 168  The court divided Supreme Court decisions involving 
familial liberty interests into two categories and reasoned that neither 
of the categories applied in Ortiz’s situation.169 
The first category, the Ortiz court explained, involved decisions 
in which the Supreme Court held that substantive due process 
prohibits the government from interfering in particularly private 
family decisions.170  These private decisions included whether to 
procreate,171 whether to educate one’s children in religious matters,172 
and how to define the family.173  According to the court, these 
 
 165 Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 7.  The original plaintiffs were Ortiz’s mother, stepfather, and siblings.  
Id.  The defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of all of the family member’s 
claims, and the district court granted the motion for all but the mother’s claims.  Id.  
The stepfather and siblings then appealed dismissal of their claims in federal 
appellate court.  Id. 
 168 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 7.  The court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (see 
supra text accompanying notes 74-77), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (see 
supra note 79), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (see discussion infra 
Part II.D.), all of which recognized the fundamental right to “freedom of personal 
choice in matters of family life.”  The court also cited Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651 (1972) (see discussion infra Part II.D.), recognizing the right of a parent to 
“companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.” 
 169 Ortiz, 807 F.2d.at 8. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).  Griswold held that a 
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was an unconstitutional violation of the 
right to marital privacy.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 172 Id. (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510). 
 173 Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).  See supra notes 
61-69 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court decisions only established protection against the state 
interfering with an individual’s right to decide how to conduct her 
family affairs.174  Additionally, the court noted that in cases involving 
parental rights, the Supreme Court had protected against 
governmental interference in the rearing of minor children, not 
adults.175  Accordingly, the court reasoned that the Ortiz case was 
different from the first category of cases in two respects: first, it did 
not involve the government’s imposition of a choice in a private 
family decision, and second, it did not involve a minor child.176  Thus, 
the court concluded that the first category of cases was inapplicable.177  
Nor did the Ortiz situation fall under the second category of cases, 
which according to the court, has held that when the state attempts 
to change the relationship of a parent and her child in order to 
further a legitimate state interest, it must adhere to strict procedural 
requirements due to the fact that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest is implicated.178  Finally, because the Ortiz case fell into 
neither the first category nor the second category of cases, the court 
concluded that Ortiz’s stepfather had no constitutional liberty 
interest in his son’s companionship.179 
 
 174 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8. 
 175 Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38-39 (1981)) 
(Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citations omitted) (“The Court has given particular 
‘constitutional respect to a natural parent’s interest both in controlling the details of 
the child’s upbringing . . . and in retaining the custody and companionship of the 
child.’”).  As examples of cases that protected this liberty interest, the court cited 
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (see supra 
notes 80-82 and accompanying text), and Moore, 431 U.S. at 505.  Ortiz, 807 F. 2d at 8. 
 176 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id.  As examples of this category of cases, the court cited Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745 (1982) (concerning termination of parental rights), Little v. Streater, 452 
U.S. 1 (1981) (determining paternity), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
(determining whether unwed father may retain custody of children after mother’s 
death). 
 179 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8.  The court also held that Ortiz’s siblings had no 
constitutional liberty interest in association with their brother, id., nor did the 
mother have a similar interest.  Id. at 7 n.1.  Significantly, the court did admit that 
Ortiz’s killing affected the parent-child relationship at least as irreversibly as a 
severance in a parent-child relationship proceeding.  Id. at 8.  The court opined, 
however, that the Supreme Court has only protected the relationship between parent 
and child when the government deliberately severs or otherwise affects the 
relationship, not when the severance is incidental as in the Ortiz case.  Id. at 9.  On 
the other hand, the court noted that while some courts have allowed constitutional 
protection for incidental deprivations, those cases at least involved one legal parent, 
unlike the Ortiz situation.  Id. at 9 n.3 (citing Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 
651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 593-95 (8th Cir. 1974); Myers v. Rask, 602 
F. Supp. 210, 211-13 (D. Colo. 1985); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 
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2. The D.C. Circuit  
In Franz v. United States,180 the D.C. Circuit found that a 
companionship right existed between a non-custodial parent and his 
minor child.  Franz dealt with a situation where various federal 
officials had relocated and changed the identities of a divorced 
mother and her minor children in accordance with the federal 
Witness Protection Program.181  The move resulted in severing the 
relationship between the children and their non-custodial father, 
who tried unsuccessfully to determine the location of his children in 
order to make contact with them.182  In finding that the father’s 
constitutional right to companionship with his children had been 
violated, the court noted that “[a]mong the most important of the 
liberties accorded . . . special treatment is the freedom of a parent 
and child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing 
relationship.”183  The willingness of the court to allow a right of 
companionship for a non-custodial parent, “one who retains and 
regularly exercises ‘visitation rights’ but who participates little in the 
day-to-day care and nurturing of his children,”184 displays that 
custodial concerns need not be present for courts to recognize the 
right. 
The holding in Franz suggests that the D.C. Circuit would 
recognize a companionship right between parents and adult 
children, but surprisingly, the circuit has refused to recognize that 
right on grounds that adult children are not as close to their parents 
as minor children are.185  The D.C. Circuit dealt specifically with the 
issue of the parental right of companionship with an adult child in 
Butera v. District of Columbia.186  The case involved the death of 31-year-
old Eric Butera while he was serving as an undercover operative for 
the police department.187  Eric had become involved in the operation 
after he called the police department with information about a 
 
(E.D. Penn. 1977)). 
 180 707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 181 Franz, 707 F.2d at 589.  The Witness Protection Program was initially 
established as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.  Id. at 586.  Its 
purpose is to provide protection for people who agree to testify against alleged 
participants of organized criminal activity.  Id. 
 182 Id. at 589. 
 183 Id. at 595. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Butera, 235 F.3d at 655-56. 
 186 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 187 Id. at 640. 
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homicide.188  Following Eric’s death, his mother, Terry Butera, filed 
suit against the District of Columbia and the four police officers who 
supervised the operation, alleging that they had failed to provide 
sufficient protection to Eric.189  The district court found for Terry, but 
the circuit court reversed, holding that there is no parental liberty 
interest in the companionship of an adult child who is 
independent.190 
Although the court’s holding was contrary to the opinion of the 
Seventh Circuit in Bell v. City of Milwaukee,191 the D.C. Circuit, like the 
Seventh Circuit, engaged in a fact-intensive analysis, paying particular 
attention to Eric Butera’s personal situation. 
Terry Butera testified that her son was an adult, living on his own, 
and that he was not providing her with any financial assistance at 
the time of his death.  The evidence further showed that Eric 
Butera had moved out of his mother’s house when he was 
eighteen years old, married, moved to Pennsylvania, and had a 
child.192 
Concluding that Eric Butera was an independent adult who was past 
minority age, the court held that Terry Butera had no constitutional 
right in his companionship.193 
The court devoted much of its analysis to the Franz194 opinion, on 
which the district court had relied when holding that Terry Butera 
had a right of companionship with her son.195  The Butera court 
distinguished Franz by noting that Franz dealt with minor children 
whereas Eric Butera was past minority age.196  Additionally, the court 
explained that it was not prepared to follow Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 
in which the Seventh Circuit had refused to draw a constitutional line 
based solely on age.197  The court instead posited that constitutional 
treatment should differ depending on whether a child is past 
minority age, in large part due to the court’s belief that the 
relationship between a minor child and a parent is markedly different 
from that of an adult child and a parent.198  Finally, although the 
 
 188 Id. at 641. 
 189 Id. at 640. 
 190 Id. at 641. 
 191 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); see infra, Part III.A.2 (discussing the opinion). 
 192 Butera, 235 F.3d at 654. 
 193 Id. at 656. 
 194 Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 195 Butera, 235 F.3d at 654. 
 196 Id. at  655. 
 197 Id. (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 198 Id. at 655-56 (citing Franz, 712 F.2d at 1432).  “When children grow up, their 
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court conceded the significance of the parent-child relationship 
regardless of a child’s age, it held that the precedent of Franz could 
not be read so broadly as to establish a constitutional liberty interest 
in companionship between a parent and an adult child.199 
While the Butera opinion held that Terry Butera did not have a 
constitutional liberty interest in companionship with her adult son, 
the court was careful to limit its holding to the particular facts of the 
situation.200  The opinion states, “we hold that a parent does not have 
a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the companionship of a 
child who is past minority and independent.”201  Hence, Butera’s holding 
only applies when an adult child is independent.202  The opinion does 
not provide guidance regarding a dependent adult child, for 
example, if a child is a college student past the age of minority, but 
not yet an independent adult. 
Rejecting a right of companionship between parents and adult 
children solely based on assumptions about relationships is wrong.203  
Experience shows that companionship may be present in a 
relationship between a parent and an adult child and it need not be 
present in the relationship between a minor and a parent.204  If a non-
custodial parent has a right to the company of his minor children 
with whom he only exercises visitation rights and with whose day-to-
day care and nurturing he has little involvement, the right must be 
based on companionship alone and extend to situations where 
custody and child-rearing concerns are not present.  It should also 
extend to the relationship between a parent and his adult child, at 
least in those cases where a close bond continues to exist. 
3. The Third Circuit  
The Third Circuit recently considered the issue of the 
substantive due process right of companionship in adult children.205  
McCurdy v. Dodd dealt with the fatal shooting of Donta Dawson, a 
 
dependence on their parents for guidance, socialization, and support gradually 
diminishes.  At the same time, the strength and importance of the emotional bonds 
between them and their parents usually decrease.”  Id. 
 199 Id. at 656. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Butera, 235 F.3d at 656 (emphasis added). 
 202 Id. 
 203 For more discussion on this topic and other related topics, see infra Part IV.  In 
essence, research indicates that the parent-child relationship may actually grow 
stronger with age.  See, e.g., Chris Knoester, Transitions in Young Adulthood and the 
Relationship Between Parent and Offspring Well-Being, SOC. FORCES, June 1, 2003, at 1431. 
 204 See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 205 McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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nineteen year-old male, stemming from a Philadelphia police 
officer’s mistaken belief that Dawson was armed.206  As a result, 
Dawson’s biological father, Bobby McCurdy, filed suit against several 
police officers and the city of Philadelphia.207  In finding against 
McCurdy, the court held that there is no substantive due process 
right in the companionship of an adult, independent child.208 
The court’s opinion first recognized that substantive due process 
analysis “‘requires scrupulous attention to the guideposts that have 
previously been established.’”209  Like the Ortiz decision, the Third 
Circuit opined that these guideposts required only protecting 
parental choice and decision-making for minor children.210  Such a 
fundamental right, then, “must cease to exist at the point at which a 
child begins to assume the critical decisionmaking responsibility for 
himself or herself.”211 
Lastly, however, the court recognized that the analysis need not 
always be so clear-cut.  The court explained that although in the 
majority of cases, adulthood would be determined by the state’s age 
of majority, in a small percentage of cases, a parent may be able to 
rebut the presumption of adulthood by providing clear and 
convincing evidence that her child was not emancipated.212  Because 
 
 206 Id. at 822.  Dawson was sitting alone in a parked car when police officers 
approached him to inquire whether he needed any help.  Id.  After repeated 
demands to raise his hands, Dawson remained unresponsive.  Id.  Believing that 
Dawson had a gun, Philadelphia police officer Christopher DiPasquale shot Dawson 
in the head, resulting in his death.  Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 830. 
 209 Id. at 826 (quoting Bayanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 
396, 400 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 210 McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 826-27. 
 211 Id. at 829.  Additionally, the McCurdy court followed Ortiz in finding that the 
Due Process Clause only protects liberty interests when the state takes deliberate 
actions against life, liberty, or property—not when the state’s actions are negligent.  
Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)).  Hence, because Officer 
DiPasquale’s actions were not deliberately directed against the parent-child 
relationship, the court found that it would be stretching due process too far if it were 
to recognize a fundamental right in Dawson’s companionship.  Id. at 830. 
 212 Id. at 830.  As an example of a situation where the court might find a right of 
companionship in an adult child, the court provided the facts of Geiger v. Rouse, 715 
A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  Id. at 830 n.8.  That case dealt with a child, over the 
age of eighteen, who had cerebral palsy and was completely dependent on her 
parents.  McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830 n.8.  Thus, it seems that the Third Circuit would 
only allow a parent to recover for the loss of an adult child in an extreme situation, 
for example, when she has an illness that renders her completely dependent.  This 
Comment argues that a parental right of companionship in adult children should be 
recognized not only in such extreme situations, but also when a parent and adult 
child share a close and fulfilling relationship, even if they are not totally dependent 
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McCurdy had provided no evidence of Dawson’s lack of 
emancipation, the Third Circuit held that McCurdy had no right of 
companionship with his son.213 
IV. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS THAT SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF A 
PARENTAL RIGHT OF COMPANIONSHIP IN ADULT CHILDREN214 
Limiting a right of companionship to only minor children is not 
in line with reality.  Experience shows that filial bonds between 
parent and child can exist well beyond the time when a child reaches 
the age of majority, and that they can cease to exist well before that 
age.  It is contrary to human experience to assume that a parent does 
not suffer a loss of companionship from tragic events severing the 
relationship between parent and child after that child reaches a 
certain age, or that the parent automatically does suffer such a loss 
when the child is a minor.  As one court has stated, 
[s]urely nature recoils from the suggestion that the society, 
companionship and love which compose filial consortium 
automatically fade upon emancipation; while common 
sense and experience teach that the elements of consortium 
can never be commanded against a child’s will at any age. 
The filial relationship, admittedly intangible, is ill-defined 
by reference to the ages of the parties and ill-served by 
arbitrary age distinctions. . . .  Therefore, to suggest as a 
matter of law that compensable consortium begins at birth 
and ends at age eighteen is illogical and inconsistent with 
common sense and experience.  Human relationships 
cannot and should not be so neatly boxed.215 
Social science data indicate that the parent-child relationship 
may actually grow more significant with age.216  A recent study 
concludes that the parent-child relationship is important for the 
psychological well-being of both parents and children throughout the 
 
on one another. 
 213 Id. at 830-31. 
 214 As discussed in Part I, substantive due process analysis does not look to social 
and economic trends to determine what is and is not a fundamental right, but rather 
to the Nation’s traditions and values.  Part IV, therefore, does not claim that the 
parental right to companionship in adult children should be recognized because of 
current social trends.  Rather, these trends are presented as evidence that reaching 
the age of majority does not necessarily end the parent-child relationship or diminish 
it to a point that it no longer merits constitutional protection. 
 215 Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 959 (Ariz. 1986) 
(dealing with state loss of consortium claims, not substantive due process claims). 
 216 Timothy D. Ament, Parents’ Loss of Consortium Claims for Adult Children in Iowa: 
The Magical Age of Eighteen, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 247, 259 (1992). 
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course of life, not only when children are minors.217  Moreover, the 
study finds that the existence of a bond between a parent and adult 
child is key to each individual’s well-being.218  Parents and adult 
children who have intimate ties experience “a sense of security and 
belonging, a perception that one is cared for deeply.”219 
Furthermore, elderly parents need not be biologically related to 
adult children to experience intimacy.220  If a stepchild’s parent 
remarries early in life, he may view the stepparent as mother or father 
by the time the child is an adult.221  Thus, the “step” aspect may 
become less meaningful as children and parents age.222  This may be 
more true in some cultures than others.223 
Numerous studies have shown that contrary to popular 
misconception, parents and adult children often have substantial 
amounts of contact, sometimes as often as weekly or more. 224  
Although contact need not be directly related to quality of 
relationship, as discussed earlier, studies indicate that parent-child 
relationships often grow stronger with age.225  Many elderly adults are 
single, widowed, or divorced; for these people, a grown child may be 
their only social contact.226  Hence, the assumption that the parent 
and child bond automatically grows less important or weaker as 
parents and children age is not consistent with recent social science 
data.  Ending a parental right of companionship with children at age 
eighteen would be unrealistic. 
 
 217 Chris Knoester, Transitions in Young Adulthood and the Relationship Between Parent 
and Offspring Well-Being, SOC. FORCES, June 1, 2003, at 1431. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Karen L. Fingerman, A Distant Closeness: Intimacy Between Parents and Their 
Children Later in Life, 25 GENERATIONS 26, 27 (2001).  The characteristics of intimacy 
shared by elderly parents and adult children, however, are unlike those of other 
intimate ties.  Id. at 29.  This intimacy can be more rewarding than the intimacy 
experienced between parents and children in early life.  Id.  “In late life, intimacy 
feels more voluntary, more reciprocal, more mutual, and more controllable than the 
closeness that is demanded when offspring are young.”  Id. 
 220 Id. at 27. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 See id.  For example, African Americans often treat fictive kin as their own 
offspring.  “Nieces, nephews, or unrelated younger adults from a church or 
community may serve in the role of a grown child.”  Id. 
 224 Lorraine T. Dorfman, Retirement and Family Relationships: An Opportunity in Later 
Life, 26 GENERATIONS 74, 76 (2002). 
 225 See Ament, supra note 216, at 259 and see id.  If the parent and child did not 
share a close relationship before the parent’s retirement, however, it is unlikely that 
they will afterwards.  Dorfman, supra note 224, at 76. 
 226 See Fingerman, supra note 219, at 26.  In fact, approximately eighty percent of 
women and forty percent of men over age seventy-five do not have a spouse.  Id. 
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Another factor that urges recognition of a parental right of 
companionship in adult children is the realization that many adult 
children are the primary caretakers of their elderly parents.227  
Although minor children require nurturing from their parents, as 
parents and children age, parents may require physical, social, and 
economic support from their adult children.228  It is estimated that 
22.4 million American households, nearly one in four, actually 
provide care to elderly adults,229 and this number is expected to 
increase to 39 million households by 2007.230  Significantly, 
approximately twenty-seven percent of all caregivers for elderly 
parents are daughters and about fifteen percent are sons.231 
An increasing number of households will take on the 
responsibility of caring for elderly parents due to the phenomenon 
known as the “graying of America.”232  It is a well-known fact that 
members of the baby-boomer population are expected to survive into 
their eighties and nineties.233  The number of elderly people has more 
than doubled since 1960, from approximately 17 million to 36 
million in 2003.234  It is estimated that there will be 51 million people 
over 65 by 2020 and 67 million by 2040.235  By the year 2020, twenty 
percent of the American population will be over the age of sixty-
five.236  Currently, about one third of the adults over age sixty-five 
years old have a severe disability and more than sixteen percent 
require assistance with daily living activities.237  For people eighty years 
 
 227 EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
EXPERIENCES OF ADULT DAUGHTERS 4 (1991).  “Families will always be the essential 
core of the long-term-care system, whether they are providing direct care or 
arranging and overseeing care provided by others.”  See also Judith A. Riggs, A Family 
Caregiver Policy Agenda for the Twenty-first Century, 27 GENERATIONS 68, 72 (2003-2004). 
 228 See Ament, supra note 216, at 259. 
 229 Taking a Vacation at a Nursing Home, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at D1. 
 230 Mariko Thompson, Handle with Care How Family Members Can Work Together when 
Elderly Parents Need Help, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at U4. 
 231 Id. 
 232 For a discussion of the phenomenon and its implications, see Kevin C. Fleming 
et al., A Cultural and Economic History of Old Age in America, MAYO CLINIC PROC., July 1, 
2003, at 914 [hereinafter Fleming, History of Old Age]. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Judy Singleton, Women Caring for Elderly Family Members: Shaping Non-Traditional 
Work and Family Initiatives, 31 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 367, 369 and U.S. Census Bureau, 
National Population Estimates, available at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2003/NC-EST2003-02.pdf. 
 235 Singleton, supra note 234, at 369. 
 236 Fleming, History of Old Age, supra note 232, at 914. 
 237 Kevin C. Fleming et al., Caregiver and Clinician Shortages in an Aging Nation, 
MAYO CLINIC PROC., Aug. 1, 2003, at 1026 [hereinafter Fleming, Caregiver and 
Clinician Shortages]. 
  
2005 COMMENT 1151 
and older, this degree of impairment is present in more than half.238 
Along with this increase in the elderly population comes the 
reminder that old age has traditionally been a problem in American 
culture for all but the very wealthy.239  The elderly usually do not have 
enough savings to maintain their former standard of living.240  
Moreover, those who can afford to live in nursing homes frequently 
face malnutrition and general neglect.241  Care provided in nursing 
homes may deteriorate due to the current nursing shortage, a result 
of the aging of the nursing population and vocational burnout.242  
Given all these factors, it is likely that more and more children will 
take on the responsibility of caring for their elderly parents and will 
continue to share intimate bonds.  Terminating a right of 
companionship between parents and children at age eighteen is 
inconsistent with these social trends. 
CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY 
Although the Supreme Court has urged restraint in implying 
fundamental rights,243 the recognition of a parental right of 
companionship in adult children does not stray from substantive due 
process guidelines.  The crux of substantive due process analysis looks 
to the traditions and culture of the American people in determining 
whether or not there exists a fundamental right that deserves 
constitutional protection.244  Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
consistently explained that American tradition emphasizes familial 
relationships, especially those of parent and child.245  Additionally, the 
Court has, on numerous occasions, discouraged the imposition of 
bright line rules in fundamental rights analysis and favored a fact-
intensive approach.246  For these reasons, it is anomalous to cut off a 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Fleming, History of Old Age, supra note 232, at 914. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See Fleming, Caregiver and Clinician Shortages, supra note 237. More factors 
contributing to the nursing shortage include fewer available workers and job 
dissatisfaction.  Id. 
 243 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 244 See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
 245 See supra Part II (discussing fundamental rights involving the family that the 
Supreme Court has recognized). 
 246 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.  Moreover, the Court has 
displayed its unparalleled respect for the parent-child relationship by recognizing the 
importance of parent-child bonds even without a traditional biological relationship 
or a marriage between the parents.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 and 92-
103. 
  
1152 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1121 
parental constitutional right of companionship at the age of majority.  
Even more so, it seems illogical to recognize a right to keep the 
family together247 and a right to the companionship, care, custody, 
and management of one’s children,248 but to not allow a general 
parental right of companionship in children. 
Courts should extend a constitutional fundamental right to 
parents in the companionship of their adult children.  This right 
should extend to foster parents and unwed natural parents as well as 
married biological parents.  A survey of substantive due process cases 
illustrates that the Court has refused to assume that the nature of a 
foster parent’s or unwed parent’s relationship with her child is 
automatically less worthy of constitutional protection than a married 
natural parent’s relationship with her child.249  Thus, the right to 
companionship of an adult child should not be automatically defined 
to exist only for natural, married parents. 
Because of the great weight the Supreme Court has accorded 
the parent-child relationship, the circuits that have refused to 
recognize a right of companionship between parents and adult 
children are wrong.  The allowance of the right is in line with 
substantive due process analysis because the court has repeatedly 
shunned the use of arbitrary lines and markers.  Refusing to extend 
the right of companionship between parents and children beyond 
the age of eighteen is exactly that – an arbitrary marker.  
Furthermore, the courts that refuse to recognize the right base much 
of their analysis on the fact that the parent-child relationship grows 
weaker with age.  Significantly, however, current research indicates 
otherwise.250 
Using the state’s age of majority as a marker for recovery creates 
the illogical situation where a deadbeat father is unjustly enriched 
from his child’s death as long as the child is a minor, and an involved 
and attached father gets no recovery because his child happens to be 
an adult.  Rather than cutting off a right of companionship at the age 
of majority, a court should determine whether a parent has a valid 
constitutional claim for loss of companionship in a child based on the 
relationship that he and his child shared.251 
 
 247 See supra Part II.B (discussing the right). 
 248 See supra Part II.D and Part III.A (discussing the right and cases that have 
recognized the right without custody concerns being present). 
 249 See supra notes 71-72, 92-107 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving 
foster parents and unwed biological parents). 
 250 See supra Part IV. 
 251 This is what the Seventh Circuit did in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 
1245 (7th Cir. 1984).  See supra text accompanying notes 142-154.  Although the D.C. 
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For example, when due to unlawful state action, a father loses a 
minor child with whom he has not spoken in years, he should not be 
able to recover on a constitutional right of companionship, regardless 
of the fact that his child was a minor.  On the other hand, when a 
father loses an adult child with whom he has a close and loving 
relationship, he should be able to recover for his loss, regardless of 
the fact that his child was nineteen years old or even thirty.  Although 
no amount of damages can compensate for the death of a child, such 
a framework for recovery comes closer to compensating parents 
justly.252 
Along with being in line with general substantive due process 
guidelines, the recognition of a parental right of companionship in 
adult children is in line with the reality of parent-child relationships 
in America. “Researchers have exploded the myth that families 
abandon their elderly relatives.”253  In fact, parents and adult children 
often share intimate relationships that can be more rewarding than 
the relationships they shared early in life.254  Though not a part of 
substantive due process analysis, social and economic trends also 
indicate that recognition of the right would be wise. 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance 
of familial relationships without the imposition of arbitrary markers.  
The Fourteenth Amendment parental right of companionship in 
adult children is not the place to begin to impose such arbitrary 
bright line rules. 
 
 
Circuit conducted a similar analysis in Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 
(D.C. Cir. 2001), see supra text accompanying notes 191-193, the court still decided to 
cut off a right of companionship at the age of majority, see supra text accompanying 
notes 197-199.  It is unclear what conclusion the court would have come to if the 
child had not been an independent adult, for example, if he were a college student.  
See supra text accompanying notes 200-202. 
 252 Of course, conducting a fact-intensive analysis is more difficult than imposing a 
bright-line rule.  Even courts that have refused to recognize the right, however, have 
done so at least partly on the basis of a fact-intensive analysis.  Furthermore, the 
position to which the Supreme Court has elevated the parent-child relationship 
discourages the imposition of bright line rules and markers in place of profound 
analyses. 
 253 ABEL, supra note 227, at 3. 
 254 See supra notes 215-226 and accompanying text. 
